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I. INTRODUCTION 
In April of 2011, the author published a piece entitled “The 
Twombly Standard and Affirmative Defenses: What is Good for 
the Goose is Not Always Good for the Gander”1 in an attempt to 
assist courts grappling with the interpretation and application 
of the new and reasonably untested Twombly and Iqbal 
decisions.  At the time, there were few cases that had broached 
the novel issue of whether the plausibility pleading standard for 
claims, which was articulated in Twombly and then clarified and 
extended in Iqbal, applied to a defendant’s pleading of 
affirmative defenses. 
That was the first piece written on the subject at length.2  It 
argued that both the text and the intention of the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure, the specific holdings and public policy 
considerations that the Supreme Court of the United States 
articulated in the Twombly and Iqbal decisions, and simple 
fairness all supported the notion that the plausibility pleading 
standard should not extend to affirmative defenses. 
Now that approximately ten years have passed, it seems like 
an appropriate time to revisit these issues.  Jurisprudence 
relating to the plausibility pleading standard is much better 
developed, and many more courts have now had the opportunity 
to consider whether that standard extends to affirmative 
defenses.  However, despite this growing maturity in the law, no 
perfect consensus has yet emerged on this question. 
The trend among the courts over the last decade has moved 
strongly away from extending the plausibility pleading standard 
to affirmative defenses.  In 2019, however, the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit decided GEOMC Co. v. 
Calmare Therapeutics Inc.,3 and became the first circuit court to 
consider the question directly.  The Second Circuit ruled that the 
 
1. Anthony Gambol, Note, The Twombly Standard and Affirmative 
Defenses: What Is Good for the Goose Is Not Always Good for the Gander, 79 
FORDHAM L. REV. 2173 (2011). 
2. A piece published by The Florida Bar identified the issue in 2010 but 
did not offer much by way of analysis or direction.  See Manuel John 
Dominguez et al., The Plausibility Standard as a Double-Edged Sword: The 
Application of Twombly and Iqbal to Affirmative Defenses, 84 FLA. B.J. 77 
(2010).  Others followed on both sides of the issue. 
3. See GEOMC Co. v. Calmare Therapeutics Inc., 918 F.3d 92 (2d Cir. 
2019). 
2https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol41/iss1/4
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plausibility pleading standard shall apply to affirmative 
defenses, with some qualifications. 
The purpose of this Article is to examine and synthesize the 
developments in this area of law over the last decade.  After 
some brief background, it will review the arguments that have 
held sway in the courts both for and against extending the 
plausibility pleading standard to affirmative defenses.  It will 
comment on the trend in the jurisprudence.  It will then offer a 
thorough review and analysis of the Second Circuit’s GEOMC 
decision, as well as offer decisions from other circuits that 
suggest their thinking.  Based upon this review, this Article 
concludes that procedure, precedent, and policy still heavily 
support not extending the plausibility pleading standard to 
affirmative defenses. 
II. BACKGROUND 
This Section introduces the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
and their relevance to standards of pleading.  It will describe the 
historical notice pleading standard for claims and how it 
changed into the modern plausibility pleading standard.  
Finally, it will describe the traditional manner of pleading 
affirmative defenses. 
A.   The Federal Rules and Notice Pleading 
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure govern procedure in 
all civil actions in the United States district courts.4  The Rules 
are promulgated by the Supreme Court under a grant of 
authorization from Congress.5  The Rules are specifically 
procedural in nature and may not “abridge, enlarge or modify 
any substantive right.”6  The analysis of the proper application 
and effect of the Rules has resulted in the countless gallons of 
spilled ink by courts, commentators, and litigants. 
 
4. FED. R. CIV. P. 1. 
5. Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072–2074.  The Rules are 
periodically updated by the Supreme Court via an elaborate committee review 
procedure, pursuant to a statutory requirement that the Judicial Conference 
of the United States, the national policy-making body for the federal courts, 
must “carry on a continuous study of the operation and effect of the general 
rules of practice and procedure . . . .”  28 U.S.C. § 331. 
6. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b). 
3
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Rule 8 describes and defines the standards of pleading in 
the federal courts.7  Failure to satisfy Rule 8 makes a claim 
susceptible to dismissal.8  For claims for relief, Rule 8(a) requires 
“a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 
pleader is entitled to relief.”9  For most of the Rules’ history, the 
interpretation of this brief but vital statement was governed 
primarily by the Supreme Court’s decision in Conley v. Gibson.10 
In Conley, the Court solidified what had previously been a 
generalized rule: claims should be allowed to stand unless the 
plaintiff can proffer “no set of facts” under which the claim will 
succeed.11  The Court based this conclusion on Rule 8, which does 
not require a plaintiff to articulate all of the facts upon which a 
claim is based.12  Rather, the Court interpreted the “short and 
plain statement” language of Rule 8 to require a plaintiff to offer 
only such allegations as are sufficient to give a defendant “fair 
notice of . . . the plaintiff’s claim . . . and the grounds upon which 
it rests.”13  This “notice pleading” standard would go on to govern 
federal pleadings for fifty years. 
B.   The Plausibility Pleading Standard 
In Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,14 the Supreme Court 
abrogated the precedent set by Conley.15  The Court instructed 
that “a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his 
‘entitlement to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, 
and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action 
 
7. FED. R. CIV. P. 8 (“Rule 8. General Rules of Pleading”). 
8. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6); see Airborne Beepers & Video, Inc. v. AT&T 
Mobility LLC, 499 F.3d 663, 667 (7th Cir. 2007); see also Mobley v. McCormick, 
40 F.3d 337, 340 (10th Cir. 1994) (“The nature of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests 
the sufficiency of the allegations within the four corners of the complaint . . . 
.”). 
9. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). 
10. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957).  Conley was a class suit in which 
the plaintiffs were African American railway workers alleging discriminatory 
disparate treatment by their union.  The union argued that the plaintiffs had 
not stated a claim for which relief could be granted and had failed to articulate 
specific facts in their complaint to support their claims. 
11. Id. at 45–46. 
12. Id. at 47. 
13. Id. 
14. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
15. E.g., E.R. v. Stitt, No. CIV-18-1137-SLP, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
159393, at *6 n.5 (W.D. Okla. Sept. 19, 2019). 
4https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol41/iss1/4
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will not do.”16  Rather, Rule 8 requires a claim to have an 
affirmative “showing” sufficient to give fair notice of the 
“grounds on which the claim rests.”17  The Court articulated that 
failure to plead sufficient factual material to nudge a claim from 
the realm of mere possibility into “plausibility” should result in 
that claim being excised at the earliest stage for the sake of 
efficiency and economy.18  Notably, the Court explained that 
some part of its analysis was intended to avoid the burden on 
defendants of abusive discovery practices and nuisance 
settlements, which, in the antitrust arena like Twombly, could 
be monumental.19  Accordingly, the Court justified requiring 
something more than simple notice of what a claim entailed: a 
complaint must contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief 
that is plausible on its face.”20 
Initially, the scale of the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Twombly was a bit circumscribed by its sounding in antitrust 
law.21  The dissent in Twombly, however, accurately presaged 
that “whether [the Court’s] test for the sufficiency of a complaint 
will inure to the benefit of all civil defendants, is a question that 
the future will answer.”22 
Indeed, just two years later, the Supreme Court expressly 
held in Ashcroft v. Iqbal23 that the Court in Twombly had 
expounded the pleading standard for “all civil actions.”24  The 
 
16. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.  The Twombly matter comprised a putative 
class action with allegations of conspiracy in restraint of trade against 
telephone and internet service carriers under the Sherman Act.  The Court 
found that even if the allegations in the complaint were consistent with 
conspiracy, “conscious parallelism” was equally likely and was not unlawful.  
Accordingly, the plaintiff had failed to make sufficient showing for the claim to 
survive; the allegations did not display that the unlawful interpretation of 
events was more “plausible” than an innocent, business-motivated one.  The 
Court found that there was “an obvious alternative explanation” that plaintiffs 
failed to vitiate. 
17. Id. at 555 n.3 (referencing both Rule 8 and Conley). 
18. Id. at 558. 
19. See id. at 559.  The dissent also acknowledged this as a rationale of 
the decision.  Id. at 573 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
20. Id. at 570, 569 n.14 (majority opinion). 
21. E.g., Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143 (2d Cir. 2007), rev’d, Ashcroft v. 
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). 
22. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 596 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
23. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 662. 
24. Id. at 684.  Iqbal related to the claims of a Pakistani immigrant 
against Attorney General John Ashcroft, inter alia, after he was detained on 
5
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Iqbal Court first reiterated the Twombly decision, that the 
standard of plausibility was not a probability requirement, but 
rather a requirement for sufficient factual support to suggest 
“more than a sheer possibility that a defendant acted 
unlawfully.”25  The Court offered relatively specific instructions 
for lower courts to consider the sufficiency of pled claims under 
its new standard: first, a court must accept as true all of the 
factual allegations of a complaint, but none of the legal 
conclusions.26  Thereupon, only a claim that contains a plausible 
claim for relief can survive a motion to dismiss—a context-
specific analysis guided by “experience and common sense.”27 
The Iqbal Court expressly disclaimed that the standard 
articulated in Twombly was limited to the antitrust context.  
Rather, it insisted that Twombly was decided based upon an 
analysis of the Federal Rules and, accordingly, that it applied in 
all contexts in which the Federal Rules apply.28 
C.   Pleading Affirmative Defenses 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(c) governs the pleading of 
affirmative defenses by defendants.29  An affirmative defense is 
a statement in a responsive pleading that precludes liability 
even if all allegations made by the plaintiff are true.30  Failure 
to plead an affirmative defense may result in its waiver.31 
 
immigration charges following the 9/11 terrorist attacks.  Plaintiff alleged that 
he was mistreated and that his constitutional rights had been violated based 
upon that treatment.  Further, he claimed that Ashcroft (and FBI Director 
Robert Mueller) “knew of, condoned . . . and maliciously agreed to subject” 
plaintiff to harsh conditions solely on account of his inclusion in several 
protected classes.  The Court originally applied the Conley “notice” standard, 
but Twombly was decided while the matter was on appeal.  After the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit applied a limited interpretation 
of Twombly and upheld the lower court’s ruling in favor of the plaintiff that 
the claims were sufficiently pled, the Supreme Court took up the matter. 
25. Id. at 678. 
26. Id. (“[M]ere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”). 
27. Id. at 678–79. 
28. See id. at 684. 
29. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c)(1) (“In responding to a pleading, a party must 
affirmatively state any avoidance or affirmative defense, including: [list of 
affirmative defenses].”). 
30. See, e.g., El Corte Ingles, S.A. v. City Lights, LLC, No. 1:19-cv-00213-
AWI-JLT, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 218435, at *26 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 19, 2019). 
31. See Meyers v. Vill. of Oxford, No. 17-cv-10623, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
24637, at *9 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 15, 2019) (“Although there are some exceptions, 
6https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol41/iss1/4
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Traditionally, simple lists of affirmative defenses were 
usually sufficient so long as they provided fair notice of the 
defense.32  In this way, the standard for assessing the sufficiency 
of an affirmative defense was reminiscent of Conley’s notice 
standard for claims.33  Even so, the courts acknowledged the 
independence of Rule 8(c).34 
Affirmative defenses may be challenged by motions to strike 
them from the pleadings under Rule 12(f).35  Such motions will 
usually be denied unless the affirmative defense’s insufficiency 
is obvious and its continued inclusion in the matter would 
prejudice the party moving to strike.36  Motions to strike are 
strongly disfavored because they are a drastic remedy.37  Most of 
 
it is generally understood that the failure to allege an affirmative defense in 
the first responsive pleading may result in a waiver of the defense.”). 
32. See, e.g., Hawkins v. Kroger Co., No. 15cv2320 JM(BLM), 2019 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 205496, at *7–8 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2019) (citing Wyshak v. City 
Nat’l Bank, 607 F.2d 824, 827 (9th Cir. 1979)); see also Arthur R. Miller, From 
Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 101 (2010) (“[D]efensive pleading[s] typically are 
alleged in a formulary, conclusory, and uninformative fashion along the style 
illustrated in Form 30 [of the Federal Rules].”). 
33. See Salcer v. Envicon Equities Corp., 744 F.2d 935, 939 (2d Cir. 1984) 
(“A motion to strike an affirmative defense . . . will not be granted unless it 
appears to a certainty that plaintiffs would succeed despite any state of facts 
which could be proved in support of the defense.”); CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & 
ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1274 (3d ed. 2008). 
34. See, e.g., Pollock v. Marshall, 845 F.2d 656, 657 n.1 (6th Cir. 1988); see 
also FTC v. AMG Servs., No. 2:12-cv-536-GMN-VCF, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
152864, at *15 (D. Nev. Oct. 27, 2014) (“Therefore, when considering a 12(f) 
motion to strike an ‘insufficient defense,’ the court finds that Twombly and 
Iqbal govern Rule 8(b)(1)(A) defenses and Conley governs Rule 8(c) affirmative 
defenses.  Rules 8(b)(1)(A) and 8(c) are not interchangeable.”). 
35. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(f); see Strobel v. Rusch, 431 F. Supp. 3d 1315, 1325 
(D.N.M. 2020) (“Rule 12(f) is intended to minimize delay, prejudice and 
confusion by narrowing the issues for discovery and trial.”). 
36. See Clark v. Milam, 152 F.R.D. 66, 70 (S.D. W. Va. 1993); WRIGHT & 
MILLER, supra note 33, at § 1381. 
37. See Harrison Co. v. A-Z Wholesalers, Inc., No. 3:19-CV-1057-B, 2020 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73191, at *2–3 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 27, 2020) (“Motions to strike 
a portion of a pleading are generally viewed with disfavor and are seldom 
granted, as such motions seek a ‘drastic remedy’ and are often sought by the 
movant simply as a dilatory tactic.”); see also Ponder v. Prophete, No. 16-2376-
CM-GLR, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 152934, at *3 (D. Kan. Nov. 3, 2016) (“[T]he 
bar for succeeding on a motion to strike is high because courts consider striking 
an affirmative defense to be a drastic remedy.  Indeed, the court should only 
utilize the legal tool where the challenged allegations cannot succeed under 
any circumstances.  The Court cannot make such a judgment with only a short 
and plain statement of defenses in response to an equally, if not more so, short 
7
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the time, affirmative defenses that do not find support in the 
record simply fall by the wayside.38 
III. PLAUSIBILITY PLEADING OF AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES IN THE 
DISTRICT COURTS 
It was against the backdrop of the rules and practices 
described briefly above that the courts began to analyze the 
application and effect of the plausibility pleading standard for 
claims on affirmative defenses.39  Courts found merits on both 
sides of the question.  This Section will address the main 
arguments presented by both sides of the issue, as well as the 
trends and the majority position. 
A. Arguments in Favor of Extension 
The courts that select to extend the plausibility pleading 
standard to affirmative defenses offer a fairly uniform collection 
of reasoning to support their decisions.  These analyses most 
frequently turn upon somewhat soft notions of expediency and 
fairness. 
Perhaps the most commonly-stated justifications for 
extending the plausibility pleading standard to affirmative 
defenses relate to mitigation of discovery abuses and the 
streamlining of defensive pleadings.40  By extending plausibility 
pleading, these courts and the litigants before them gain 
something in efficiency and judicial economy.41  These courts 
 
and plain statement of the claim.  This is especially true where discovery has 
not yet commenced.”); WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 33, at § 1380. 
38. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(f); Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Moseley, No. 
14-00789-CV-W-DW, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 185450, at *3 (W.D. Mo. May 26, 
2015); Wells Fargo & Co. v. United States, 750 F. Supp. 2d 1049, 1052 (D. 
Minn. 2010). 
39. See Gambol, supra note 1, at 2195 (“After Twombly, the continued 
validity of the traditional manners of pleading affirmative defenses and 
determining their sufficiency [were] in doubt.”); see also Falley v. Friends 
Univ., 787 F. Supp. 2d 1255, 1256 (D. Kan. 2011) (“The issue before the court 
is whether the pleading standards of Twombly and Iqbal apply to affirmative 
defenses, or only complaints.”). 
40. See, e.g., Taylor v. City of Saginaw, No. 17-cv-11067, 2020 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 11114, at *6 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 23, 2020); Racick v. Dominion L. Assocs., 
270 F.R.D. 228, 233 (E.D.N.C. 2010) (“[B]oilerplate defenses clutter the docket 
and . . . create unnecessary work and extend discovery.”). 
41. See, e.g., McGinity v. USAA Fed. Savs. Bank, No. 5:19-cv-560-BO, slip 
8https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol41/iss1/4
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find further support in their analysis of the “underlying 
rationale” of Twombly and Iqbal: to eliminate fishing 
expeditions and reduce the cost associated with discovery.42  
These courts equate the costs associated with meritless claims 
to those fostered by meritless affirmative defenses.43 
Some courts that choose to extend plausibility pleading to 
affirmative defenses seek to support that position by parsing the 
Federal Rules.  Usually, this interpretation hinges upon 
similarities between language in Rule 8(a) and Rule 8(b), which 
governs the pleading of “Defenses; Admissions and Denials.”44  
These courts, perhaps anticipating a counterargument, frame 
Rule 8(c) as a subset of Rule 8(b), where Rule 8(c) exists to add 
additional requirements on the pleading of affirmative defenses 
and offers a list of examples, but is otherwise subsumed by Rule 
8(b).45 
There is a notion among courts that choose to extend that 
the application of a different standard of support for a claim and 
a defense is definitionally unfair.46  A more specific variant of 
this argument is that because both claims and affirmative 
defenses are pleadings; the standard for “pleadings” should be, 
 
op. at 2 (E.D.N.C. Apr. 14, 2020); FDIC v. Bristol Home Mortg. Lending, LLC, 
No. 08-81536, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74683, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 13, 2009). 
42. See Johnson v. City of Saginaw, No. 17-cv-13174, 2018 WL 6168036, 
at *2 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 30, 2018); HCRI TRS Acquirer, LLC v. Iwer, 708 F. 
Supp. 2d 687, 691 (N.D. Ohio 2010). 
43. PetroJebla, SA de C.V. v. Betron Enters., No. 19-11439, 2019 WL 
6496565, at *8 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 3, 2019); Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. O’Hara Corp., 
No. 08-CV-10545, 2008 WL 2558015 (E.D. Mich. June 25, 2008). 
44. See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(b); see also Espitia v. Mezzetti Fin. Servs., Inc., 
No. 18-cv-02480-VKD, 2019 WL 359422, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 2019); 
Hayden v. United States, 147 F. Supp. 3d 1125, 1129 (D. Or. 2014) (“[A] party 
is held to the same ‘short and plain’ content requirement whether asserting a 
claim for relief or asserting a defense to a claim for relief.  The drafters could 
have used different language or phrases to describe parties’ duties when 
asserting a claim for relief or a defense (or affirmative defense), but they did 
not.”); Vogel v. Huntington Oaks Del. Partners, LLC, 291 F.R.D. 438, 440–41 
(C.D. Cal. 2013); HCRI TRS Acquirer, LLC v. Iwer, 708 F. Supp. 2d 687, 691–
93 (N.D. Ohio 2010). 
45. See Gomez v. Bird Auto., LLC, 411 F. Supp. 3d 1332, 1337 (S.D. Fla. 
2019); Hayne v. Green Ford Sales, Inc., 263 F.R.D. 647, 649 (D. Kan. 2009). 
46. Andean Life, LLC v. Barry Callebaut U.S.A. LLC, No. 20-20765-Civ-
Williams/Torres, 2020 WL 1703552, at *4–5 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 8, 2020); Palmer v. 
Oakland Farms, Inc., No. 5:10cv00029, 2010 WL 2605179, at *5 (W.D. Va. June 
24, 2010). 
9
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and is, the same.47 
These courts acknowledge that there might be some 
prejudice to defendants by having their defenses struck for being 
insufficiently pled at an early stage of litigation or because 
defendants have a limited timeframe in which to respond.48  But 
even so, they feel that a liberal construction of Rule 15 should 
ameliorate the problem by allowing defendants to amend their 
answer.49 
B.   Arguments Against Extension 
The courts that decline to extend the plausibility pleading 
standard to affirmative defenses usually turn at the first (and 
sometimes only) instance to Twombly, Iqbal, and the Rules 
themselves.  Twombly and Iqbal specifically interpreted Rule 
8(a) and do not even mention Rule 8(c).50  As noted above, Rule 
8(a) governs the pleading of claims, and Rule 8(c) governs 
 
47. Taylor v. City of Saginaw, No. 17-cv-11067, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
11114, at *6 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 23, 2020); Racick v. Dominion L. Assocs., 270 
F.R.D. 228, 233 (E.D.N.C. 2010) (“[W]hat is good for the goose is good for the 
gander.”); In re Mission Bay Ski & Bike, Inc., Nos. 07 B 20870, 08 A 55, 2009 
WL 2913438, at *6 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Sept. 9, 2009) (citations omitted) 
(“Affirmative defenses are pleadings and so are subject to all pleading 
requirements under the Federal Rules. . . That means affirmative defenses 
must meet the notice–pleading standards of Rule 8(a).”); Pylant v. Cuba, No. 
3:14-CV-0745-P, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 189656, at *12 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 6, 2015) 
(pointing out that this argument is overstated, where it stems from Rule 8(e)’s 
requirement that all pleadings must be “simple, concise, and direct”). 
48. Vogel, 291 F.R.D. at 441; Francisco v. Verizon S., Inc., No. 3:09-cv-737, 
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77083, at *15 (E.D. Va. July 29, 2010). 
49. See McGinity v. USAA Fed. Savs. Bank, No. 5:19-cv-560-BO, slip op. 
at 3 (E.D.N.C. Apr. 14, 2020); Racick, 270 F.R.D. at 234; Palmer, 2010 WL 
2605179, at *6 (“Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure contemplates 
that motions to amend pleadings on that basis of relevant facts learned during 
discovery, and such motions should be liberally granted.”). 
50. Daley v. Scott, No. 2:15-cv-269-FtM-29DNF, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
83735, at *5 (M.D. Fla. June 28, 2016) (“[N]either Twombly nor Iqbal 
addressed whether Rule 8(c) requires an affirmative defense, like a claim for 
relief, to be pled with ‘enough facts’ to show that [it] is plausible on its face.”); 
Sprint Sols., Inc. v. Shoukry, No. 2:14-cv-00127, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 152851, 
at *5 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 28, 2014) (“As numerous courts have observed, Iqbal and 
Twombly analyzed only complaints and Rule 8(a)(2).”); Paleteria La 
Michoacana v. Productos Lacteos, 905 F. Supp. 2d 189, 190 (D.D.C. 2012) 
(“Iqbal and Twombly interpreted Rule 8(a)(2), which sets forth the pleading 
requirements for a complaint.  Affirmative defenses are governed by a different 
provision, Rule 8(c).”).  See generally Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 
544 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2011). 
10https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol41/iss1/4
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affirmative defenses.51  While Rule 8(a) requires “a short and 
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled 
to relief,” Rule 8(c) requires merely that “a party must 
affirmatively state any avoidance or affirmative defense.”52  The 
plausibility pleading standard hinges upon Rule 8(a)’s 
requirement of a “showing.”53  However, Rule 8(c) does not 
require any “showing” by a defendant.54  Accordingly, the text of 
the Rules shows that the plausibility pleading standard applies 
only to claims plead pursuant to Rule 8(a) and does not apply to 
affirmative defenses plead pursuant to Rule 8(c).55 
Many courts that decline to extend plausibility pleading 
point to the difference in time available to the parties to a 
lawsuit to formulate their pleadings.  In this view, it is not fair 
to hold the parties to the same standard of factual support where 
 
51. See, e.g., Vazquez-Robles v. CommoLoCo, Inc., 186 F. Supp. 3d 138, 
149 (D.P.R. 2016) (“[I]n Twombly and Iqbal, the Supreme Court interpreted 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), which sets forth the pleading 
requirements for a complaint and employs different language, governs a 
different pleading, and affects a different stage of the litigation than Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 8(c), which governs affirmative defenses.”). 
52. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a), (c); see United States v. All Assets Held at Bank 
Julius Baer & Co., 268 F. Supp. 3d 135, 144 (D.D.C. 2017). 
53. E.g., Vann v. Inst. of Nuclear Power Operations, Inc., No. 1:09-CV-
1169-CC-LTW, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 165320 (N.D. Ga. Oct. 6, 2011); see 
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 n.3 
54. See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c); see also United States ex rel. Patzer v. Sikorsky 
Aircraft Corp., 382 F. Supp. 3d 860, 866 (E.D. Wis. 2019); Henry v. Ocwen Loan 
Servicing, LLC, No. 17cv0688 JM(NLS), 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30779, at *6–
7 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 26, 2018); Lane v. Page, 272 F.R.D. 581, 592 (D.N.M. 2011) 
(“The Court agrees with the latter cases that rule 8(c), which provides the 
requirements for pleading affirmative defenses, does not require factual 
support.”); Charleswell v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., No. 01-119, 2009 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 116358, at *12–13 (D.V.I. Dec. 8, 2009); Am. Res. Ins. Co. v. 
Evoleno Co., No. 07-0035-WS-M, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55181, at *6 n.7 (S.D. 
Ala. July 30, 2007). 
55. Craten v. Foster Poultry Farms Inc., No. CV-15-02587-PHX-DLR, slip 
op. at 4 (D. Ariz. June 24, 2016); Jam Tire, Inc. v. Harbin, No. 3:14-cv-00489, 
2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124581, at *6–8 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 5, 2014) (“I am 
required to give the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure their plain meaning. . . . 
To apply a plausibility standard to affirmative defenses would place an 
unrealistic burden on defendants irreconcilable with the plain meaning of Rule 
8(c) and the overriding consideration that pleadings ‘must be construed so as 
to do justice.’”); Flame S.A. v. Indus. Carriers, Inc., No. 2:13-cv-658, 2014 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 86662, at *5 (E.D. Va. June 24, 2014); EEOC v. Joe Ryan Enters., 
281 F.R.D. 660, 662 (M.D. Ala. 2012); Lopez v. Asmar’s Mediterranean Food, 
Inc., No. 1:10-cv-1218 (JCC), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2265, at *5 (E.D. Va. Jan. 
10, 2011) (“[The Court] is first bound to apply the relevant rules of civil 
procedure as written.”). 
11
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plaintiffs have years to develop their positions while defendants 
have to respond within, usually, twenty-one days.56  Therefore, 
the equities support maintaining separate standards.57 
Courts that decline to extend plausibility pleading also 
regularly explain how the policy and practical concerns 
expressed in Twombly and Iqbal—relating to judicial efficiency 
and cost savings to parties—are advanced by declining to 
extend.  First, extending plausibility pleading is likely to cause 
a great increase in the volume of motions to strike affirmative 
defenses.58  But nearly all motions to strike affirmative defenses 
are without value.59  And any inefficiencies caused by simply-
 
56. Bigfoot on the Strip, LLC v. Winchester, No. 18-3155-CV-S-BP, 2018 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 173447, at *4–5 (W.D. Mo. Oct. 9, 2018); Henry, 2018 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 30779, at *7–8 (“[A] plaintiff may investigate a potential claim for 
weeks, months, or even years before filing a complaint.  To expect a defendant 
to retain counsel, investigate claims, adequately prepare an answer, and to 
plead affirmative defenses with particularity within 21 days of service of the 
complaint . . . would seem to be unrealistic in most cases[.]”); Craten, slip op. 
at 5; Vann, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 165320, at *13–14. 
57. Wells Fargo & Co. v. United States, 750 F. Supp. 2d 1049, 1051 (D. 
Minn. 2010) (“Whatever one thinks of Iqbal and Twombly, the ‘plausibility’ 
requirement that they impose is more fairly imposed on plaintiffs who have 
years to investigate than on defendants who have 21 days.”). 
58. See, e.g., Ross v. Sharp One, Inc., No. 19-2293-KHV, 2019 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 179162, at *5 (D. Kan. Oct. 15, 2019) (“Applying Twombly and Iqbal to 
affirmative defenses would ‘invite many more motions to strike, which achieves 
little.’”); Bayer CropScience A.G. v. Dow AgroSciences LLC, No. 10-1045 
RMB/JS, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 149636, at *4 (D. Del. Dec. 30, 2011) (declining 
to extend plausibility pleading to affirmative defenses based in part on “the 
fact that a heightened pleading requirement would produce more motions to 
strike, which are disfavored” and “the low likelihood that motions to strike 
affirmative defenses would expedite the litigation, given that leave to amend 
is routinely granted”); cf. Francisco v. Verizon S., Inc., No. 3:09-cv-737, 2010 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77083, at *10–11 (E.D. Va. July 29, 2010) (anticipating the 
onrush of mostly useless motion practice that its decision to extend plausibility 
pleading will cause and requesting plaintiffs not do that). 
59. See Holtzman v. B/E Aerospace, Inc., No. 07-80551-CIV-
MARRA/JOHNSON, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42630, at *2–3 (S.D. Fla. May 28, 
2008) (listing many cases that have described motions to strike as “time 
wasters”); see also Green v. Obsu, No. ELH-19-2068, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
26183, at *15 (D. Md. Feb. 13, 2020) (“Rule 12(f) motions are generally viewed 
with disfavor because striking a portion of a pleading is a drastic remedy and 
because it is often sought by the movant simply as a dilatory tactic.”); Moore v. 
R. Craig Hemphill & Assocs., No. 3:13-cv-900-J-39-PDB, slip op. at 5 (M.D. Fla. 
May 6, 2014) (“Persuaded by the latter approach and its fidelity to both the 
rule that a court must give effect to a law that has plain and unambiguous 
meaning . . . and the longstanding adversity to striking an affirmative defense 
unless it does not have any possible connection to the controversy and might 
prejudice a party if it remains (an adversity left untouched by Iqbal and 
12https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol41/iss1/4
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pled affirmative defenses are, at most, slight.60  Second, 
discovery is limited to the pleadings.61  Discovery will be more 
contentious as plaintiffs resist defendants’ attempts to develop 
factual support for affirmative defenses that they were 
prevented from pleading.62  Third, defendants who wait to plead 
affirmative defenses, or who have had previously-pled 
affirmative defenses struck, will be forced later to move to 
amend their pleadings after some discovery has taken place.63  
And no matter how liberal the standards are in favor of 
amendment, plaintiffs will surely resist defendants’ requests, 
adding yet another round of motion practice.64  All told, 
extending plausibility pleading to affirmative defenses 
inexorably encourages a cavalcade of wasteful motion practice.65 
 
Twombly), the Court applies that approach here.”). 
60. See Traincroft, Inc. v. Ins. Co. of Pa., No. 14-10551-FDS, 2014 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 85170, at *10 (D. Mass. June 23, 2014) (“[A]ffirmative defenses 
generally add little marginal cost.”); Baum v. Faith Techs., Inc., No. 10-CV-
0144-CVE-TLW, 2010 WL 2365451, at *4 n.9 (N.D. Okla. June 9, 2010) (noting 
the “utter lack of meaningful prejudice” presented by the continued existence 
of defendant’s affirmative defenses). 
61. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1). 
62. See Laporte v. Bureau Veritas N. Am. Inc., No. 1:12-cv-09543, slip op. 
at 4 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 18, 2013) (“The Court would also like to avoid the discovery 
disputes that would inevitably develop as a defendant seeks discovery related 
to affirmative defenses it had not stated in its answer.”); Leon v. Jacobson 
Transp. Co., No. 10 C 4939, 2010 WL 4810600, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 19, 2010). 
63. Henry v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, No. 17cv0688 JM(NLS), 2018 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30779, at *7–8 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 26, 2018) (“[A] heightened 
pleading standard may require the court to address multiple motions to amend 
the answer as discovery reveals additional defenses.”); Florilli Transp. v. W. 
Express, Inc., No. 14-CV-00988-DW, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 185459, at *4 
(W.D. Mo. Feb. 20, 2015) (“[T]hen, after taking discovery, [defendants will 
need] to move the Court for permission to amend their answers to add 
affirmative defenses . . . Thus, another round of motion practice would be added 
to many cases, increasing the burdens on the federal courts, and adding 
expense and delay for the parties.”). 
64. See United States ex rel. Patzer v. Sikorsky Aircraft Corp., 382 F. 
Supp. 3d 860, 867 (E.D. Wis. 2019); Bigfoot on the Strip, LLC v. Winchester, 
No. 18-3155-CV-S-BP, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 173447, at *5 (W.D. Mo. Oct. 9, 
2018) (“Plaintiffs would often resist those motions on the grounds that the 
proposed affirmative defenses would be futile. Thus, another round of motion 
practice would be added to many cases, increasing the burdens on the federal 
courts, and adding expense and delay for the parties.”); Wells Fargo & Co. v. 
United States, 750 F. Supp. 2d 1049, 1052 (D. Minn. 2010). 
65. Ross v. Sharp One, Inc., No. 19-2293-KHV, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
179162, at *5 (D. Kan. Oct. 15, 2019) (“Finally, the Court does not want to 
‘encourage parties to bog down litigation by filing and fighting motions to 
strike answers or defenses prematurely.’  The goal of Rule 12(f) is to ‘minimize 
13
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C.   The “Majority” Position That Isn’t 
Around the time of the author’s previous work on this 
subject, a few dozen district courts had weighed in and most had 
ruled that plausibility pleading also applied to the pleading of 
affirmative defenses.66  Today, however, thousands of cases have 
addressed the issue.67  While many courts still select to extend 
the plausibility pleading standard to affirmative defenses, that 
is no longer the majority position.68  Rather, the movement in 
the district courts over the last decade has been decidedly away 
from the extension of the plausibility pleading standard to 
affirmative defenses.69  Courts selecting not to extend the 
plausibility pleading standard to affirmative defenses now 
comprise a sizable majority.70 
 
delay, prejudice, and confusion.’”); Sikorsky Aircraft Corp., 382 F. Supp. 3d at 
867 (“What would clog the docket clutter [sic] is applying a rigorous pleading 
standard to affirmative defenses.”); Ponder v. Prophete, No. 16-2376-CM-GLR, 
2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 152934, at *1–4 (D. Kan. Nov. 3, 2016); cf. Barnes v. 
AT&T Pension Benefit Plan, 718 F. Supp. 2d 1167, 1175–76 (N.D. Cal. 2010) 
(“It is the court’s opinion that while plaintiff partially succeeded on the merits 
of his motion, the issues raised would not have been difficult to address solely 
between the parties.”). 
66. Lane v. Page, 272 F.R.D. 581, 589–90 nn.5–6 (D.N.M. 2011) (listing 
cases); Barnes, 718 F. Supp. 2d at 1171. 
67. See Brian Soucek & Remington B. Lamons, Heightened Pleading 
Standards for Defendants: A Case Study of Court-Counting Precedent, 70 ALA. 
L. REV. 875 (2019); Justin Rand, Tightening Twiqbal: Why Plausibility Must 
Be Confined to the Complaint, 9 FED. CTS. L. REV. 79 (2016). 
68. Soucek & Lamons, supra note 67; Hansen v. R.I.’s Only 24 Hour Truck 
& Auto Plaza, Inc., 287 F.R.D. 119, 122 (D. Mass. 2012) (noting that the weight 
of a majority had recently flipped). 
69. Soucek & Lamons, supra note 67, at 891–95 (finding in a laborious 
study that the majority view among the district courts has been against 
extending the plausibility pleading standard since August of 2011 and that, as 
of the time of their writing, more than sixty-two percent of the decisions to 
squarely address the question, and seventy-one percent in the Second Circuit, 
selected not to extend); see Goldsmith v. Lee Enters., No. 4:19CV1772 HEA, 
2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 178132, at *10–11 (E.D. Mo. Oct. 15, 2019); Benedict v. 
Hankook Tire Co., No. 3:17-cv-109, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26129, at *6 (E.D. 
Va. Feb. 16, 2018); Hand Held Prods., Inc. v. Code Corp., No. 17-167-RMG, 
2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89271, at *18 (D.S.C. June 9, 2017); Advanced Pain 
Mgmt. Servs., LLC v. Wadhwa, No. MJG-12-3579, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7703, 
at *3 (D. Md. Jan. 22, 2014). 
70. Whetstone Indus., Inc. v. Yowie Grp., Ltd., No. 3:17-cv-1286-J-20PDB, 
2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177086, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 11, 2019) (noting a 
majority among courts selecting not to extend the plausibility pleading 
standard to affirmative defenses); Leviton Mfg. Co. v. Pass & Seymour, Inc., 
264 F. Supp. 3d 421, 427 (E.D.N.Y. 2017) (“The overwhelming majority view, 
14https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol41/iss1/4
2020 PLEADINGS & AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES 207 
Despite this reality, there persists a continuing 
misapprehension that a majority of the district courts support 
the extension of the plausibility pleading standard to affirmative 
defenses.  This error can be traced to some of the earliest 
decisions to consider the issue, when, indeed, it was not an error.  
The first reference to a nascent majority position on the issue 
appears to have been in Hayne v. Green Ford Sales, Inc.71  Hayne 
was decided a mere seven months after Iqbal and offered a count 
of nine-to-three in favor of extension.72  About five months later, 
the court in Barnes v. AT&T Pension Benefit Plan73 cited to 
Hayne in support of its proposition that “the vast majority of 
courts presented with the issue have extended Twombly’s 
heightened pleading standard to affirmative defenses.”74  This 
proposition was challenged at the time.75  Even so, Barnes 
currently has over 300 citing decisions, and some courts persist 
in citing to Barnes for its “vast majority” language.76  This 
practice is not supportable and should be ended.77 
 
to which I subscribe, is that the concept of plausibility has no application to 
affirmative defenses.”).  See generally Soucek & Lamons, supra note 67, at 891. 
71. Hayne v. Green Ford Sales, Inc., 263 F.R.D. 647, 649–50 (D. Kan. 
2009). 
72. Id. at 650 & n.15. 
73. Barnes v. AT&T Pension Benefit Plan, 718 F. Supp. 2d 1167 (N.D. Cal. 
2010). 
74. Id. at 1171 (“[T]he vast majority of courts presented with the issue 
have extended Twombly’s heightened pleading standard to affirmative 
defenses.”). 
75. See, e.g., Riemer v. Chase Bank USA, N.A., 274 F.R.D. 637, 640 n.3 
(N.D. Ill. 2011) (“While it may be a stretch to say of the more than 100 cases 
that have considered the applicability of Iqbal and Twombly to affirmative 
defenses that the ‘vast majority of . . . districts’ are in favor of the application, 
it does appear that a majority are.”). 
76. See, e.g., OMS Collections, Ltd. v. Tien, No. 19-23471-Civ-
WILLIAMS/TORRES, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14281, at *11–12 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 
27, 2020); Romero v. Makan, No. 5:18-CV-353-ODW (SHKx), 2018 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 111334, at 3 & n.2 (C.D. Cal. July 3, 2018). 
77. Continued relevance harkens to the worrisome possibility of selective 
counting among the district courts, which is worse yet when decisions are 
rendered based in some part on the weight of an erroneously believed majority 
position.  See Barnes, 718 F. Supp. 2d 1167; Soucek & Lamons, supra note 67, 
at 902–11.  By way of a simplified example, in the Northern District of Indiana 
(just to pick a jurisdiction), there are now more cases that have declined to 
extend the plausibility pleading standard to affirmative defenses than there 
were to support Hayne’s point that a majority existed favoring extension.  See, 
e.g., Keller v. Enhanced Recovery Co., No. 4:18-cv-15, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
186043 (N.D. Ind. Oct. 31, 2018); Droz v. Droz, No. 2:17-cv-00451-RL-JEM, 
2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111761 (N.D. Ind. July 5, 2018); Reger v. Ariz. RV Ctrs., 
15
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Further, the majority declining to extend the plausibility 
pleading standard to affirmative defenses becomes even more 
commanding when one considers courts and not just decisions.  
There is a small yet active minority of courts in which a very 
large number of pro-extension cases are decided.78  These courts 
appear to grant such motions readily, and, accordingly, plaintiffs 
appear to be bombarding these courts with motions to strike 
affirmative defenses that might not be granted in other 
jurisdictions.79  Among other problems, these activities inflate 
 
LLC, No. 3:16-CV-778-MGG, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89773 (N.D. Ind. May 30, 
2018); Briley v. Lawson, No. 3:17-CV-522-JD-MGG, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
80624 (N.D. Ind. May 14, 2018); Maloy v. Stucky, Lauer & Young, LLP, No. 
1:17-CV-336-TLS, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58084 (N.D. Ind. Apr. 5, 2018); 
Friend v. Taylor Law, PLLC, No. 4:17-CV-29-JVB-PRC, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
203695 (N.D. Ind. Dec. 11, 2017); Markel Ins. Co. v. United Emergency Med. 
Servs., LLC, No. 2:16-CV-220-JVB-PRC, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34266 (N.D. 
Ind. Mar. 10, 2017); Design Basics, LLC v. Windsor Homes, Inc., No. 1:16-cv-
00051-PPS-SLC, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91910 (N.D. Ind. July 14, 2016); 
Husainy v. Allied Collection Serv., Inc., No. 4:15-CV-95-JVB-PRC, 2016 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 54003 (N.D. Ind. Apr. 22, 2016); Fletcher v. Hoeppner Wagner & 
Evans, LLP, No. 2:14-CV-231-RL-PRC, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 153057 (N.D. 
Ind. Nov. 12, 2015); Cottle v. Falcon Holdings Mgmt., LLC, No. 2:11-CV-95-
PRC, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10478 (N.D. Ind. Jan. 30, 2012).  But in reality, 
this fact offers no insights into whether this district, the Seventh Circuit, or 
the nation on the whole tilts one way or the other.  Indeed, the court in Hayne 
offered no suggestion that its count was exhaustive (and it was not), but that 
did not prevent it from spawning the “majority” myth.  See Home Mgmt. Sols., 
Inc. v. Prescient, Inc., No. 07-20608-CIV-LENARD/TORRES, 2007 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 61608, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 21, 2007).  The author’s previous work on 
this topic warned against the risk of courts feeling pressured to comport with 
a “majority” position.  Gambol, supra note 1, at 2207 (“The action within the 
district courts presents a very real danger of snowballing.”).  It appears that 
this admonition proved prescient. 
78. Soucek & Lamons, supra note 67, at 894. 
79. See, e.g., Gomez v. Bird Auto., LLC, 411 F. Supp. 3d. 1332, 1338 (S.D. 
Fla. 2019) (“When coupling the three considerations discussed above with the 
fact that a majority of courts have agreed with this position, we hold that there 
is no separate standard for complaints and affirmative defenses in connection 
with Rule 8.  See, e.g., Barnes . . . see also Hayne.”); Pollo Campestre, S.A. DE 
C.V. v. Campero, Inc., No. 19-Civ-20001-SCOLA/TORRES, 2019 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 186749, at *10–11 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 29, 2019) (“When combining these 
considerations with the fact that a majority of courts have agreed with this 
position, we hold that there is no separate standard under Rule 8 for a 
complaint and an affirmative defense.  See, e.g., Barnes . . . see also Hayne.”); 
Westchester Gen. Hosp., Inc. v. Evanston Ins. Co., 333 F.R.D. 594, 599 (S.D. 
Fla. 2019) (“When coupling the three considerations discussed above with the 
fact that a majority of courts have agreed with this position, we hold that there 
is no separate standard for complaints and affirmative defenses in connection 
with Rule 8.  See, e.g., Barnes . . . see also Hayne.”); Tokio Marine Specialty Ins. 
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the number of decisions in favor of extension.  In other words, 
absent a few outlier jurisdictions offering an outsized number of 
decisions on this subject, the majority of cases and courts in 
favor of not extending the plausibility pleading standard to 
affirmative defenses is overwhelming. 
IV. ACTION AT THE CIRCUIT LEVEL 
The Second Circuit recently became the first United States 
Court of Appeals to rule explicitly on whether to extend the 
plausibility pleading standard to affirmative defenses.  In 
GEOMC Co. v. Calmare Therapeutics Inc.,80 the Second Circuit 
answered that question in the affirmative.  This Section will 
review the Second Circuit’s GEOMC decision and examine a 
number of questions and issues that the decision presents.  It 
will also address briefly how other circuit courts have suggested 
that they might approach the issue. 
A.  The Second Circuit’s Decision in GEOMC Co. v. 
Calmare Therapeutics Inc. 
At the trial level, the GEOMC matter sounded broadly in 
breach of contract, where the plaintiff alleged that the defendant 
had failed to pay for certain medical devices that the plaintiff 
had manufactured for the defendant, resulting in the plaintiff’s 
right to payment and fees.81  The trial court agreed and found 
for the plaintiff on a number of counts on summary judgment.82  
 
Co. v. Ramos, No. 19-22069-CIV-SCOLA/TORRES, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
160301, at *11 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 20, 2019) (“When coupling the three 
considerations discussed above with the fact that a majority of courts have 
agreed with this position, we hold that there is no separate standard for 
complaints and affirmative defenses in connection with Rule 8.  See, e.g., 
Barnes . . . see also Hayne.”); Rubinstein v. Keshet Inter Vivos Tr., No. 17-
61019-Civ-WILLIAMS/TORRES, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99428, at *15–16 
(S.D. Fla. June 13, 2019) (“When coupling the three considerations discussed 
above with the fact that a majority of courts have agreed with this position, we 
hold that there is no separate standard for complaints and affirmative defenses 
in connection with Rule 8.  See, e.g., Barnes . . . see also Hayne.”). 
80. GEOMC Co. v. Calmare Therapeutics Inc., 918 F.3d 92 (2d Cir. 2019). 
81. GEOMC Co. v. Calmare Therapeutics Inc., No. 3:14-cv-01222 (VAB), 
2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 162353 (D. Conn. Sept. 29, 2017). 
82. GEOMC Co. v. Calmare Therapeutics Inc., No. 3:14-cv-01222 (VAB), 
2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131986 (D. Conn. Aug. 18, 2017). 
17
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A later trial established the quantum of damages.83 
In March of 2019, the Second Circuit issued a pair of 
opinions, the first of which vacated and remanded the matter for 
various reasons.84  The Second Circuit rendered a separate 
opinion, affirming the lower court’s previous ruling to strike two 
of the defendant’s affirmative defenses and some 
counterclaims.85  The affirmative defenses at issue were the 
defendant’s claims that the plaintiff’s damages were caused by 
its own negligence and that the plaintiff had failed to join a 
necessary party.86 
The Second Circuit offers this second opinion specifically to 
“clarify the standards for pleading affirmative defenses and 
granting a motion to strike them.”87  It begins by recounting the 
procedural posture of the “complicated” case below.88  After the 
plaintiff filed an amended complaint, the defendant timely 
answered.89  Nine months later, the defendant sought leave to 
amend its answer to add affirmative defenses and 
counterclaims.90  This request was opposed while the plaintiff 
simultaneously sought leave to file a second amended complaint 
to add an additional claim.91  The Second Circuit states that the 
situation was “unusual,” as was the lower court’s solution: to 
deny the defendant leave to amend its answer to the amended 
complaint, to grant the concurrent motion for the plaintiff to 
amend its complaint again, and to permit the defendant to file 
an answer to the second amended complaint.92  At the same 
time, the lower court invited the plaintiff to move to strike 
should the defendant “exceed[] the scope of permissible 
amendment.”93  The plaintiff filed its second amended complaint, 
 
83. GEOMC, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 162353. 
84. GEOMC Co. v. Calmare Therapeutics Inc., 768 F. App’x 1 (2d Cir. 
2019). 
85. GEOMC, 918 F.3d at 94–95 (citing GEOMC Co. v. Calmare 
Therapeutics Inc., No. 3:14-CV-01222 (VAB), 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144735, 
at *5–6 (D. Conn. Oct. 19, 2016)). 
86. GEOMC, 918 F.3d at 99. 
87. Id. at 94.  The Court also sought to clarify the standard for presenting 






93. Id. (“In effect, [the lower court] authorized the Plaintiff to use a motion 
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the defendant filed its answer (with added affirmative defenses 
and counterclaims), the plaintiff moved to strike, and the lower 
court granted the motion in part.94  The defendant appealed.95 
The Second Circuit prefaces its review with the observation 
that some lower courts have “not always distinguished between 
affirmative defenses in a timely filed answer and those later 
filed, either with or without court permission to amend an 
answer, especially those filed in late stages of litigation.”96  It 
then delineates the Federal Rules that articulate the periods 
within which defendants may timely file affirmative defenses 
under different circumstances.97 
The Second Circuit’s “starting point” is Rule 12(f) regarding 
motions to strike.98  It traces the history of the standard 
governing motions to strike affirmative defenses in its circuit 
from the adoption of the Federal Rules.99  The Second Circuit 
notes that it did not address the pleading standard necessary for 
affirmative defenses to survive a motion to strike for many 
years.100  When it did articulate a standard for adjudging the 
sufficiency of a pled affirmative defense, that standard broadly 
mirrored the Conley notice standard for pled claims.101  The 
Second Circuit notes that the Conley standard for claims was 
abrogated by Twombly and was replaced by a plausibility 
standard.102 
 
to strike under Rule 12(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to raise 
whatever issues it would have raised in opposition to the Defendant’s motion 
to amend its answer under Rule 15(a)(2).”). 
94. Id. at 94–95. 
95. Id. at 95. 
96. Id. (noting the “uncertainty” this practice has caused). 
97. Id. (listing Rules 12(a)(1)(A)(i), 15(a)(1)(A), 15(a)(2), and 15(a)(3), each 
of which require or permit defendants to submit affirmative defenses at 
different times). 
98. Id. (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 12(f)(1), (2)) (“Rule 12(f) . . . provides that a 
court may strike ‘from a pleading’ any ‘insufficient defense or any redundant, 
immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.’”). 
99. Id. at 95–96. 
100. Id. at 96. 
101. Id. at 95–96 (“[A] motion to strike an affirmative defense, apparently 
timely filed, will not be granted unless ‘it appears to a certainty that plaintiffs 
would succeed despite any state of the facts which could be proved in support 
of the defense.’” (quoting William Z. Salcer, Panfeld, Edelman v. Envicon 
Equities Corp., 744 F.2d 935, 939 (2d Cir. 1984), vacated on other grounds, 478 
U.S. 1015 (1986))). 
102. Id. at 96. 
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The Second Circuit describes how a district court in SEC v. 
McCaskey103 derived elements of review from the Second 
Circuit’s previous guidance and articulated a test to review a 
motion to strike an affirmative defense; the test has been used 
and modified by other courts.104  To prevail on a motion to strike 
an affirmative defense, the McCaskey test requires: “a plaintiff 
must show that: (1) there is no question of fact which might allow 
the defense to succeed; (2) there is no question of law which 
might allow the defense to succeed; and (3) the plaintiff would 
be prejudiced by the inclusion of the defense.”105  The Second 
Circuit ultimately applies the McCaskey approach.106  It admits, 
however, that the court below did not cite to or apply the 
McCaskey standard, but rather a standard properly applied to 
the pleading of claims.107 
Perhaps because of this confusion, the Second Circuit takes 
the opportunity “to clarify the factors relevant to striking an 
affirmative defense.”108  “To avoid having district courts continue 
to repeat the three-factor formulation as worded in McCaskey, 
we consider each of those factors in turn.”109 
The Second Circuit first asks whether the first factor of the 
McCaskey test should be modified in the wake of Twombly.110  It 
notes that the issue “has divided the many district courts and 
commentators that have considered it.”111  The Second Circuit 
 
103. SEC v. McCaskey, 56 F. Supp. 2d 323 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). 
104. GEOMC, 918 F.3d at 96–97 & n.6 (“Fifteen years after Salcer, a 
District Court in this Circuit purported to extract from that opinion a three-
part test . . . This formulation divided Salcer’s reference to facts into two 
factors, one concerned with facts, and the other concerned with law.  The 
McCaskey formulation also added a third factor, prejudice to the plaintiff, a 
factor not mentioned in Salcer.”). 
105. Id. at 96 (quoting McCaskey, 56 F. Supp. 2d at 326). 
106. Id. at 97–99 (applying McCaskey, with some criticisms). 
107. Id. at 97 & n.7. 
108. Id. at 97. 
109. Id. 
110. Id. (“[At issue is] [w]hether the first of the McCaskey factors should 
be reworded in light of Twombly, i.e., whether Twombly applies to the pleading 
of affirmative defenses.”). 
111. Id. at 97 & n.8 (“Three comprehensive articles take three different 
approaches.  One article favors applying Twombly to affirmative defenses.  One 
opposes applying Twombly to affirmative defenses.  One proposes a ‘middle-
ground approach.’”).  In a footnote, the Second Circuit compares three cases on 
the pro-extension side—Perez v. Gordon & Wong L. Grp., P.C., No. 11-CV-
03323-LHK, 2012 WL 1029425 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2012); HCRI TRS Acquirer, 
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immediately “conclude[s] that the plausibility standard of 
Twombly applies to determining the sufficiency of all pleadings, 
including the pleading of an affirmative defense, but with 
recognition that, as the Supreme Court explained in Iqbal, 
applying the plausibility standard to any pleading is a ‘context-
specific’ task.”112 
“The key aspect of the context relevant to the standard for 
pleading an affirmative defense is that an affirmative defense, 
rather than a complaint, is at issue.  This is relevant to the 
degree of rigor appropriate for testing the pleading of an 
affirmative defense.”113  The Second Circuit notes that plaintiffs 
have years to develop factual plausibility for their claims, while 
defendants must respond within a few weeks.114  Further, it 
instructs that a court applying its standard must consider the 
nature of the specific affirmative defense pled, and that 
sometimes a “relaxed” standard should apply.115 
The Second Circuit does not modify the second or third 
factors of the McCaskey test.116  However, it does clarify that the 
third factor—prejudice—should infrequently be a basis for 
striking an otherwise valid affirmative defense because an 
effective defense should prejudice a plaintiff.117 
Based upon these considerations, the Second Circuit 
reexamines the lower court’s decision to strike two of the 
 
LLC v. Iwer, 708 F. Supp. 2d 687 (N.D. Ohio 2010); Tracy v. NVR, Inc., No. 04-
CV-6541L, 2009 WL 3153150 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2009)—to three cases on the 
anti-extension side—Leviton Mfg. Co. v. Pass & Seymour, Inc., 264 F. Supp. 
3d 421 (E.D.N.Y. 2017); Hon Hai Precision Indus. Co. v. Wi-LAN, Inc., No. 12 
Civ.7900(SAS), 2013 WL 2322675 (S.D.N.Y. May 28, 2013); Lane v. Page, 272 
F.R.D. 581 (D.N.M. 2011).  Id. at n.8.  The Second Circuit also notes that 2 
JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 12.37[4] (3d ed. 2018) 
states that the “better view” is that Twombly does not extend and cites to 
WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 33, at § 1274 for the proposition that Wright & 
Miller do not offer an opinion on the matter.  GEOMC, 918 F.3d at 97–98. 
112. GEOMC, 918 F.3d at 98 (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 
(2009)). 
113. GEOMC, 918 F.3d at 98. 
114. Id. (“That aspect of the context matters.”). 
115. Id. (“For example, the facts needed to plead a statute-of-limitations 
defense will usually be readily available; the facts needed to plead an ultra 
vires defense, for example, may not be readily known to the defendant, a 
circumstance warranting a relaxed application of the plausibility standard.”). 
116. Id. at 98–99. 
117. Id. (noting that the exception is if the defense is offered “beyond the 
normal times limits of the Rules”). 
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defendant’s affirmative defenses.  Although the district court 
had permitted the defendant to file an answer, the Second 
Circuit reminds us that the defendant had been warned against 
expanding the scope of the matter and agreed that these 
defenses “introduce[d] vague allegations regarding the actions of 
unnamed third parties, raising concerns of both legal sufficiency 
and prejudice to GEOMC.”118  Further, the Second Circuit notes 
that the answer in which these affirmative defenses had been 
proffered did not indicate to what actions or parties the 
affirmative defenses at issue pertained.119  Accordingly, 
“[s]triking these two affirmative defenses was within the 
District Court’s discretion.”120 
 
[Defendants] needed to support these defenses 
with some factual allegations to make them 
plausible.  Moreover, both affirmative defenses 
were presented at a late stage of the litigation.  
Although the defenses were presented soon after 
[the plaintiff] filed its second amended complaint, 
they were not aimed at the one new cause of action 
. . . Expanding the litigation at that stage would 
have been prejudicial to [the plaintiff].121 
 
The Second Circuit then proceeds to consider questions 
related to the defendant’s dismissed counterclaims.122 
B.   Challenges Presented by the Second Circuit’s Decision 
The Second Circuit’s stated intention in drafting the 
GEOMC decision was to “clarify” matters relating to the 
pleading of affirmative defenses and resolving motions to strike 
them.  Unfortunately, it does not seem likely that the Second 
Circuit’s decision will meaningfully affect that goal.  While the 
lower courts in the Second Circuit must follow the GEOMC 
 
118. Id. at 99 (quoting GEOMC Co. v. Calmare Therapeutics Inc, No. 3:14-
cv-01222(VAB), 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114735, at *14 (D. Conn. Oct. 19, 
2016)). 
119. GEOMC, 918 F.3d at 99. 
120. Id. 
121. Id. 
122. Id. at 99–102. 
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precedent, rather than offer solutions, GEOMC instead raises a 
number of new questions and muddies a number of waters. 
1. The Second Circuit Forgoes Support or Analysis 
The primary difficulty of the GEOMC decision is that the 
Second Circuit offers literally no analysis or support for its 
ruling that the plausibility pleading standard applies to 
affirmative defenses.123  Rather, the Second Circuit 
acknowledges that there is a difference of opinion among district 
courts and commentators, states flatly that the plausibility 
pleading standard now applies to affirmative defenses, and then 
moves directly into a discussion of the degree of rigor that should 
be applied to its newly-created standard.124 
The Second Circuit does not indulge a single reference to 
Rule 8(c), or indeed any part of Rule 8, the actual Rule at issue 
and upon which the instant decision imposes an 
interpretation.125  This omission is particularly conspicuous 
because the Second Circuit quotes language from, and delves 
into the distinct requirements of, several other Federal Rules.126  
As noted, the difference in language between Rules 8(a) and 8(c), 
particularly in light of the fact that Twombly and Iqbal 
specifically and exclusively deal with Rule 8(a), is perhaps the 
foremost and most powerful argument that courts consider when 
selecting not to extend the plausibility pleading standard to 
affirmative defenses.127  It is very problematic that the Second 
Circuit fails to address this point.  Given the cases and 
commentaries that the Second Circuit references, it seems 
improbable that its silence is inadvertent.128  We are left to 
speculate about what the Second Circuit intended to 
communicate by omitting this point that is directly relevant and, 
indeed, determinative to the issue at hand. 
 
123. See id. at 98–99. 
124. See id. at 99. 
125. See id. passim. 
126. Id. at 95. 
127. See supra notes 50–55 and accompanying text. 
128. See GEOMC, 918 F.3d at 97. 
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2. The Authority the Second Circuit Cites Does Not 
Support Its Conclusion 
The Second Circuit’s reasoning behind its decision that 
Twombly should apply to affirmative defenses is even more 
challenging to reconstruct based upon its citations.  Indeed, the 
authority the Second Circuit selects to reference does not appear 
to support its conclusion.129 
First, in discussing the divergence of opinion, the Second 
Circuit appears to have crafted its account to be largely balanced 
between the opposing sides.  It references three pro-extension 
cases and three anti-extension cases; it cites to three 
commentaries: one pro-extension, one anti-extension, and one 
that it describes as in the middle; and it cites to the leading 
procedural treatises, one anti-extension and one that it believes 
does not offer an opinion.130  This balanced manner of the Second 
Circuit stymies one possible approach to understanding its 
reasoning.  If it had cited only anti-extension articles, for 
instance, a reader could probably assume that it found those 
pieces persuasive.  But because the Second Circuit leveled the 
field and does not offer further support or analysis as discussed 
above,131 a reader is challenged to infer what reasoning the 
Second Circuit may have found germane, or what references it 
may have found persuasive.132 
On a closer inspection of the cited authority, the Second 
Circuit predominantly uses references that oppose extending 
 
129. Some trouble with GEOMC’s citations is foreshadowed by the Second 
Circuit’s formulation of the question before it: “Whether the first of the 
McCaskey factors should be reworded in light of Twombly . . . is an issue that 
has divided the many district courts and commentators that have considered 
it.”  Id.  But, strictly speaking, none of the cases, commentaries, or treatises 
referenced address McCaskey or its factors on this question.  Rather than 
addressing an existing issue, GEOMC may have created one. 
130. GEOMC, 918 F.3d at 97. 
131. See supra notes 123–28 and accompanying text. 
132. It is also worth noting that the Second Circuit’s balance is artificial.  
As discussed previously, there is a robust majority of cases nationally that have 
declined to extend Twombly to affirmative defenses.  See supra notes 67–69 
and accompanying text.  In the Second Circuit, there was an even more 
commanding majority opposed.  See id.  Further, the Second Circuit’s 
presentation of three articles that address the issue omits reference to the 
dozens of other pieces of scholarship that have addressed the issue, a majority 
of which, much like the majority of courts, argue against extension.  E.g., 
Gambol, supra note 1. 
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Twombly to affirmative defenses.  Among cases on the pro-
extension side, the court cites two out-of-circuit cases and one in-
circuit case decided four months after Iqbal in 2009.133  Among 
cases on the anti-extension side, the court cites one out-of-circuit 
case and two in-circuit cases from 2017 and 2013.134  While the 
Second Circuit is, of course, able to cite to whatever authority it 
pleases and is not bound by any lower court precedent in its 
district, it certainly feels odd that it has selected to reference a 
greater number of more recent case law from within its own 
circuit on the anti-extension side. 
More emphatically, however, do the commentaries and 
treatises the Second Circuit cites reject extension.  As noted, the 
court references three commentaries, where one favors the 
application of Twombly to affirmative defenses, one opposes 
such application, and one “proposes ‘a middle-ground 
approach.’”135  But this is not a fair representation of the third 
article, which argues decisively against extension.136  Indeed, the 
brief language that the court cites comes from a section entitled 
“V. Solution: Courts Should Not Hold Affirmative Defenses to 
the Plausibility Standard.”137  Further, the court cites Moore’s 
Federal Practice and Wright & Miller’s Federal Practice & 
Procedure, the premier treatises on Federal Civil Procedure.138  
The Second Circuit acknowledges that Moore advises against 
applying a plausibility pleading standard to affirmative 
defenses.139  It also states, however, that Wright & Miller take 
no position on the issue.140  This is not correct.  Rather, Wright 
& Miller, like Moore, clearly instruct that plausibility pleading 
should not apply to affirmative defenses.141 
 
133. GEOMC, 918 F.3d at 97 n.8. 
134. Id. 
135. Id. at 97 (quoting Nathan Psyno, Note, Should Twombly and Iqbal 
Apply to Affirmative Defenses?, 64 VAND. L. REV. 1633, 1670 (2011)). 
136. See generally Psyno, supra note 135. 
137. Id. at 1669–71. 
138. GEOMC, 918 F.3d at 97–98. 
139. Id. at 98. 
140. Id. 
141. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 33, at § 1381 (“The better view is that 
the plausibility standard only applies to the pleading of affirmative claims for 
relief.”); 2 MOORE ET AL., supra note 111, at ¶ 8.08[1] (“[A]ffirmative defense 
pleading should not be subject to the same ‘plausibility’ standard applicable in 
pleading a claim for relief.”); see also United States ex rel. Patzer v. Sikorsky 
Aircraft Corp., 382 F. Supp. 3d 860, 864 n.1 (E.D. Wis. 2019) (“The two highly 
25
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In this additional way, the Second Circuit’s conclusion to 
extend plausibility pleading to affirmative defenses is 
challenging to understand.  Support among courts, 
commentators, and treatises is strongly against extension, 
including among the authority the court chooses to reference. 
3. Litigation Stage Timeliness 
The Second Circuit mentions several times that the notion 
of timeliness is relevant to its decision.142  And the court suggests 
throughout its opinion that there was something untimely about 
the defendant’s response.143  The affirmative defenses at issue in 
the instant matter, however, were offered by the defendant in a 
timely-filed answer.144  Stated simply, timeliness was not an 
issue in the appeal.145 
Rather, the Second Circuit repeatedly indicates that special 
negative consideration should be accorded to affirmative 
defenses pled in “a late stage of litigation.”146  Reading the 
decision overall, it seems that this “litigation stage timeliness”—
the raw timeframe in which various litigation activities occur—
is of great concern.  Indeed, the court several times elides the 
important distinction between timeliness under the Federal 
Rules and this litigation stage timeliness.147  This confusion of 
the issues does not benefit the opinion’s intelligibility. 
Litigation stage timeliness is a somewhat surprising place 
 
respected treatises on federal practice [Wright & Miller and Moore’s] both 
recommend against applying the plausibility standard to affirmative 
defenses.”). 
142. GEOMC, 918 F.3d at 95, 96, 99. 
143. Id. 
144. Id. at 94–95. 
145. It is appropriate to point out that there is no “timeliness” of any sort 
in Rule 8, and while there is an element of timeliness in Rule 12(f), it does not 
implicate the affirmative defenses struck in the instant matter.  See FED. R. 
CIV. P. 8, 12(f). 
146. GEOMC, 918 F.3d at 99. 
147. E.g., id. at 95 (“Uncertainty has sometimes resulted from the fact 
that district courts . . . have not always distinguished between affirmative 
defenses in a timely filed answer and those later filed, either with or without 
court permission to amend an answer, especially those filed in late stages of 
litigation.”); Id. at 99 (“[Defendant] needed to support these defenses with some 
factual allegations to make them plausible.  Moreover, both affirmative 
defenses were presented at a late stage of the litigation.  Although the defenses 
were presented soon after [plaintiff] filed its second amended complaint . . .”). 
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for the Second Circuit to delve.  First, and most obviously, 
because it does not address the issue that the court has set out 
to address.148  Second, because the notion is quite vague.149  
Third, because litigation routinely take years without specific 
prejudices to any party.  Fourth, because the lion’s share of 
litigation stage timeliness is controlled not by the parties but 
instead by the court—its decisions, its local rules, and the 
realities of its docket and schedule.  Fifth, because this focus 
incentivizes plaintiffs to engage in dilatory practices in order to 
deny defendants the ability to plead defenses.  Sixth, because 
the Federal Rules offer many tools for courts to manage 
litigation stage timeliness and provide plainly when a party may 
offer affirmative defenses or amend pleadings.150 
Further, the Second Circuit elides that the affirmative 
defenses at issue were part of a request by the defendant to 
amend its answer before the second amended complaint was 
filed.151  Indeed, the relationship of these affirmative defenses to 
the second amended complaint was compelled by the trial court’s 
“unusual” solution to the “complicated” procedural posture of the 
matter.152  The Second Circuit’s ruling that the defendant’s 
affirmative defenses were somehow untimely—and would 
prejudice the plaintiff—punishes the defendant for both 
adhering to the Federal Rules and following the trial court’s 
instructions.153 
 
148. See id. 
149. See id. at 94, 100.  The Second Circuit has a problem with the 
defendant’s motion to amend nine months after its original answer, but does 
not articulate just what stage to which the litigation had progressed that would 
be damaged by the inclusion of two additional affirmative defenses. 
150. E.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 15(b)(1). 
151. GEOMC, 918 F.3d at 94. 
152. See id. 
153. It is somewhat beyond the purview of this Article, but GEOMC has 
also likely denied defendants the ability to respond freely to amended 
complaints, even with a court’s permission.  The permissible scope of a 
defendant’s response under Rule 15(a) to an amended complaint is a subject 
more commonly addressed in the context of counterclaims.  See, e.g., Uniroyal 
Chem. Co. v. Syngenta Crop Prot., Inc., No. 3:02CV02253(AHN), 2005 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 4545, at *3–8 (D. Conn. Mar. 23, 2005) (noting that, while no court 
of appeals has addressed the issue, the lower courts tend to fall into three 
camps: (1) permissively allowing defendants to file answers regardless of scope, 
(2) narrowly limiting defendant’s responses to amended complaints to the 
newly-amended material, and (3) a “moderate approach” where the scale of 
plaintiff’s changes inform the scale permitted to defendants; and concluding 
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Moreover, the Second Circuit elects not to acknowledge that 
the plaintiff’s new allegations in the second amended complaint 
arise at an identically “late stage[] of the litigation” as the 
defendants’ affirmative defenses.154  In all likelihood, the 
plaintiff’s new allegations expand the scope of the litigation and 
are significantly more prejudicial than a few affirmative 
defenses. 
Finally, the Second Circuit’s consideration of litigation 
stage timeliness works to undermine a common justification for 
extending the plausibility pleading standard to affirmative 
defenses: that defendants would later be freely able to amend 
their pleadings to add affirmative defenses.155  Instead, plaintiffs 
now have another argument to attempt to prevent just that. 
4. Wherefore McCaskey 
The Second Circuit’s lengthy discussion of the McCaskey 
standard and its application also raises questions.  To begin, the 
court does not seem to approve of McCaskey.156  At a point, the 
court expressly repudiates the McCaskey standard as written.157  
Despite this, the court systematically applies McCaskey and, 
indeed, requires this approach to be used within the Second 
Circuit.158 
What might be even more confusing is that the Second 
Circuit engages in this exercise at all.  The lower court did not 
cite to or rely on the McCaskey standard; the Second Circuit’s 
examination of the McCaskey standard is sua sponte.159  Indeed, 
 
that “[s]imply put, principles of fairness compel the court to conclude that if a 
plaintiff is permitted to expand the scope of the case by amending her 
complaint to add new theories of recovery, a defendant should be permitted to 
do the same [thing].”).  And, indeed, the issue is addressed more directly in the 
remainder of the GEOMC decision, which considers the defendant’s attempt to 
amend to add counterclaims.  GEOMC, 918 F.3d at 99.  A defendant’s 
affirmative defenses appear now to be circumscribed by the specific content of 
the amended complaint.  See id. 
154. GEOMC, 918 F.3d at 95, 99–101. 
155. See supra notes 48–49 and accompanying text. 
156. See GEOMC, 918 F.3d at 96–99 (citing SEC v. McCaskey, 56 F. Supp. 
2d 323 (S.D.N.Y. 1999)). 
157. GEOMC, 918 F.3d at 96–97. 
158. Id. at 99–102. 
159. See id. at 97–99.  McCaskey appears once in the prior proceedings, in 
a reference to another case that cites McCaskey.  GEOMC Co. v. Calmare 
Therapeutics Inc., No. 3:14-cv-01222 (VAB), 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144735, at 
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the court acknowledges that the court below applied a standard 
derived via a different line of cases.160  Moreover, in exploring 
McCaskey, the court delineates a line of cases beginning with 
McCaskey that has, over many years, altered and refined the 
McCaskey standard into its current form.161 
This all raises two additional curiosities.  First, given that 
McCaskey is not used in the case below, is not a universally 
applied standard in the Second Circuit, and is significantly 
different in its current form from when it was decided, it is 
unclear why the Second Circuit selects this opportunity to 
prevent “district courts continu[ing] to repeat the three-factor 
formulation as worded in McCaskey.”162  There does not appear 
to be much risk of that.  Second, given the disfavor in which the 
Second Circuit appears to hold McCaskey’s formulation, the 
alternative case law in the Second Circuit, and the 
acknowledged distance between the modern formulation of the 
McCaskey standard and the one actually presented in McCaskey, 
it is unclear just why the court chooses to apply the McCaskey 
standard as it was originally written.163 
The Second Circuit makes no changes at all to the second or 
third original McCaskey factors.164  In this way, the court 
abrogates any judicial refinements to those portions in 
intervening years. 
However, the real action is in the Second Circuit’s treatment 
of the first original McCaskey factor.  The court describes its 
inquiry as “[w]hether the first of the McCaskey factors should be 
 
*9 (D. Conn. Oct. 19, 2016) (citing Coach, Inc. v. Kmart Corps., 756 F. Supp. 
2d 421, 426 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)).  The Second Circuit says that the court below 
cited Coach (quoting McCaskey) for the proposition that “[i]f a court determines 
that a defense is legally insufficient, the court must next determine whether 
inclusion of the defense would prejudice the plaintiff.”  GEOMC, 918 F.3d at 
97.  This is not correct.  The court below cited Coach (and quoted McCaskey) 
for the proposition that “the Court should construe ‘the pleadings liberally to 
give the defendants a full opportunity to support its claims at trial, after full 
discovery has been made.’”  GEOMC, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144735, at *12–
13.  This is the only proposition for which Coach cites McCaskey and the only 
proposition for which McCaskey appears below. 
160. GEOMC, 918 F.3d at 97–99. 
161. Id.; see SEC v. McCaskey, 56 F. Supp. 2d 323 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). 
162. GEOMC, 918 F.3d at 97. 
163. See id. at 96–97. 
164. Id. at 98. 
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reworded in light of Twombly.”165  Yet this is a question to which 
it never returns.  The court does not articulate a new 
formulation, nor does it reject the existing language.166 
So, the court somehow incorporates Twombly into the first 
factor of McCaskey’s existing three-part test.167  However, it is 
not clear exactly how.  There are many options.  The first 
McCaskey factor could be replaced with some language of 
Twombly.  Or perhaps the McCaskey formulation still exists and 
Twombly provides a standard to satisfy it.168  Or perhaps the 
whole McCaskey standard has been functionally superseded.  If 
McCaskey remains, what is the relationship between the factors 
now?  Is one preeminent?  Need all be satisfied?  Are they 
disjunctive? 
5. Below Plausibility; Above Fair Notice 
The Second Circuit expressly embraces applying Twombly 
to affirmative defenses.169  But the court strongly emphasizes 
the “context” provisions of Iqbal, which seem intended to temper 
a bright-line application of any rule.170  It also states that the 
evaluation of affirmative defenses must be less rigorous than 
that of claims.171  The Second Circuit instructs that courts 
examining affirmative defenses should be guided in their 
inquiry by the brief timeframe accorded to defendants to gather 
facts and by the specific affirmative defenses pled, of which there 
are dozens of options.172  These imperatives will necessarily 
 
165. Id. at 97. 
166. See supra notes 103, 108 and accompanying text. 
167. See GEOMC, 918 F.3d at 97 & n.8. 
168. This approach would be akin to those courts that have suggested that 
Twombly merely describes the quantum of information necessary to provide 
fair use under pre-existing standards.  E.g., Dodson v. Munirs Co., No. S-13-
0399 LKK/DAD, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85768, at *16–17 (E.D. Cal. June 18, 
2013). 
169. GEOMC, 918 F.3d at 97–98. 
170. Id. at 98 n.9.  This is a bit of a sleight of hand, where Iqbal extended 
a rule developed in the antitrust context to all civil actions and greatly 
expanded the scope of plausibility pleading.  See supra notes 27–28 and 
accompanying text. 
171. GEOMC, 918 F.3d at 98. 
172. See supra notes 111–14 and accompanying text.  The 
acknowledgement and concern for the unfairness visited upon defendants by 
the extension of plausibility pleading to affirmative defenses is a primary 
reason cited by courts choosing not to extend.  See supra notes 56–57 and 
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require district courts, in every instance, to engage in a less 
rigorous inquiry than they perform for claims because, in every 
instance, defendants have far less time than plaintiffs to collect 
factual material for their pleading.173  At the same time, every 
affirmative defense must undergo a unique inquiry because the 
factual support to prove each affirmative defense is different, 
and, therefore, a different showing is required to render each one 
“plausible,” given context.174 
All told, the Second Circuit has mandated that the district 
courts develop as many gradations of scrutiny as there are 
affirmative defenses.  And on its instruction of a less rigorous 
inquiry, these dozens (hundreds?) of independent review 
standards must exist somewhere below plausibility yet above 
fair notice.  This is before considering whether the same 
affirmative defense might be accorded a different review given 
litigation stage timeliness concerns.175  It seems likely that the 
new standard will introduce significant uncertainty to 
pleadings.176 
The examples that the Second Circuit provides do not add 
significant clarity.  The court offers a pair of affirmative defenses 
that possess, in its estimation, different expected availability of 
factual material (and, presumably, one should be struck and one 
should not).177  Further, the court states simply that “the facts 
needed to plead a statute-of-limitations defense will usually be 
readily available.”178  However, it is not entirely clear why the 
facts to support a statute of limitations affirmative defense will 
usually be readily available, and noting the word “usually,” the 
court offers no guidance as to how a court should determine 
whether the instance in front of it is, or is not, one where the 
 
accompanying text.  By attempting to accommodate this unfairness in its new 
rule, the Second Circuit tacitly acknowledges that it is a powerful argument 
against extension. 
173. See GEOMC, 918 F.3d at 98. 
174. Id. 
175. See supra notes 141–54 and accompanying text. 
176. It is beyond the scope of this Article, but a question also arises about 
the Second Circuit’s new standard and pled claims.  The “context” requirement 
derived from Iqbal seems like it would apply to pled claims too, but the 
Supreme Court does not suggest in Twombly or Iqbal that different levels of 
scrutiny will apply at different times or to different claims; plausible is 
plausible. 
177. GEOMC, 918 F.3d at 98. 
178. Id. 
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facts relevant to the defense are readily available to the 
defendant.  On the other hand, the court states that “the facts 
needed to plead an ultra vires defense . . . may not be readily 
available.”179  Again, the circumstances in which the facts may 
or “may not be” readily available are not suggested by the Second 
Circuit.180  This is a scenario that seems ripe for abuse by clever 
plaintiffs.181 
Without more specific guidance, the Second Circuit’s 
examples suggest the unusual result that affirmative defenses 
with “readily apparent” facts should be struck for implausibility, 
while affirmative defenses more fairly characterized as fishing 
expeditions will be allowed to proceed.  And requiring a 
defendant to plead facts that are “readily apparent” at the 
penalty of losing its, say, statute of limitations defense is 
reminiscent of the strict pleading standards that the Federal 
Rules were adopted specifically to abolish.182 
C.   In Conclusion Regarding GEOMC 
Given these many and sundry peculiarities of the GEOMC 
decision, it is not clear that the Second Circuit succeeded in its 
 
179. Id. 
180. This specific selection of ultra vires as an example of an affirmative 
defense where the factual complexity is such that it is inoculated against 
motions to strike is also a bit puzzling.  In New York, at least, the “Defense of 
ultra vires” is a legislative provision codifying that there is no cause of action 
sounding in ultra vires, absent a few enumerated exceptions.  N.Y. BUS. CORP. 
LAW § 203 (McKinney 2019).  Either the plaintiff has offered a statutorily 
infirm claim, or it has not; this should be ascertainable from the content of the 
complaint. 
181. See Burget v. Capital W. Sec. Inc., No. CIV-09-1015-M, 2009 WL 
4807619, at *3–4 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 8, 2009) (striking a statute of limitations 
affirmative defense with prejudice over defendant’s argument that plaintiff 
had not pled sufficient information to determine whether they were time-
barred); cf. Stoffels ex rel. SBC Tel. Concession Plan v. SBC Commc’ns, Inc., 
No. 05-CV-0233-WWJ, 2008 WL 4391396, at *2 n.3 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 22, 2008) 
(declining to strike an affirmative defense because plaintiffs had not alleged 
relevant facts). 
182. See Charles E. Clark, Simplified Pleading, 2 F.R.D 456, 458 (1943) 
(“Strict pleading produces a reaction, because people will not tolerate the 
denial of justice for formalities only.  That, as we should do well to recall, was 
the history of common-law pleading, as well as of some of the later 
misapplications of code pleading.”); see also LINDA J. SILBERMAN ET AL., CIVIL 
PROCEDURE: THEORY AND PRACTICE 540 (3d ed. 2009) (“The modern pleader is 
at much lesser risk of losing his rights through a technical pleading mistake.”); 
FED. R. CIV. P. 8(d)(1) (“No technical form is required.”). 
32https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol41/iss1/4
2020 PLEADINGS & AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES 225 
goal to “clarify the standards for pleading affirmative 
defenses.”183  The lower courts in the Second Circuit, however, 
are constrained to attempt to apply the new mechanism, 
regardless of the challenges presented by the ruling. 
The district courts have exhibited difficulty interpreting the 
Second Circuit’s directives and applying them in a cohesive 
manner.  Some have offered distinct and not necessarily 
compatible formulations of the new rule.184  Others have taken 
 
183. GEOMC, 918 F.3d at 94 (2d Cir. 2019) (“[T]o clarify the standards for 
pleading affirmative defenses and granting a motion to strike them.”). 
184. See, e.g., Jablonski v. Special Couns., Inc., No. 1:16-cv-05243 (ALC), 
2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53531, at *6–7 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 25, 2020) (“[I]n 
determining whether to apply plausibility standard or a relaxed version . . .”); 
State St. Glob. Advisors Tr. Co. v. Visbal, 431 F. Supp. 3d 322, 347 (S.D.N.Y. 
2020) (“The Second Circuit has recently clarified that the plausibility standard 
of Twombly applies to determining the sufficiency of all pleadings, including 
‘the pleading of an affirmative defense.’  Hence, a party asserting affirmative 
defenses must ‘support these defenses with some factual allegations to make 
them plausible.’”); Haber v. Bankers Standard Ins. Co., No. 3:19-cv-276 (VLB), 
2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 222847, at *2–3 (D. Conn. Dec. 31, 2019) (“An 
affirmative defense may be stricken if (a) it does not meet ‘the plausibility 
standard of Twombly’; (b) it is a legally insufficient basis for precluding a 
plaintiff from prevailing on its claims; or (c) it prejudices the defendant and it 
is presented beyond the normal time limits of the Rules.  When considering a 
motion to strike affirmative defenses, the Court should construe the pleadings 
liberally to give the defendant a full opportunity to support its claims at trial, 
after full discovery has been made.”); Car-Freshner Corp. v. Just Funky LLC, 
No. 5:19-CV-0289 (GTS/ATB), 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 203958, at *2–4 
(N.D.N.Y. Nov. 25, 2019) (“In its clarification of the affirmative-defense 
standard, the Second Circuit has focused on the three-factor test used by the 
Southern District of New York to assess affirmative defenses in [McCaskey].  
The McCaskey three-factor test requires a plaintiff to show as follows: ‘(1) there 
is no question of fact which might allow the defense to succeed; (2) there is no 
question of law which might allow the defense to succeed; and (3) the plaintiff 
would be prejudiced by inclusion of the defense.  . . . [T]he pleading party must 
produce allegations of fact that provide a sufficient basis for the court to draw 
a reasonable inference in favor of the party.”); New London Assocs., LLC, v. 
Kinetic Soc. LLC, No. 18cv7963 (DLC), 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 113021, at *3 
(S.D.N.Y. July 8, 2019) (“[Plaintiff] cannot reasonably argue that it lacks a 
sufficient factual basis to understand the nature of [Defendant’s] proposed 
affirmative defenses.”).  Compare Car-Freshner Corp., 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
203958, at *7 (while acknowledging a lesser burden on plaintiffs in this 
instance, rejecting affirmative defenses pled “Plaintiffs’ claims are barred by 
doctrine of equitable estoppel” and “Plaintiffs’ claims are barred by the doctrine 
of unclean hands generally”); with Emerson Elec. Co. v. Holmes, No. 16-cv-
1390 (PKC)(SIL), 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100957, at *16 (E.D.N.Y. June 14, 
2019) (sustaining defenses pled “The Complaint and its claims are barred by 
the doctrine[] of . . . estoppel” and “Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the doctrine 
of unclean hands”). 
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the Second Circuit’s impalpable “context” to strange places.185  
Moreover, the judicial effort required to render these decisions 
appears to be substantial.186 
Despite all this, there is a significant weight of authority, 
both mandatory and persuasive, behind a circuit court decision.  
Courts in the minority that still favor extending plausibility 
pleading to affirmative defenses now have a large hook upon 
which to hang their hats.187 
D.   How the Wind Blows in Other Circuits 
A number of circuit courts have made post-Twombly rulings 
that suggest that they will not rule in favor of extension when 
they choose to address it directly.  Either obliquely or directly, 
these courts have ruled that affirmative defenses are not subject 
to a heightened pleading standard. 
For example, the Fifth Circuit continues to apply the fair 
notice standard.188  Likewise, but more express, the Ninth 
Circuit has ruled that “the ‘fair notice’ required by the pleading 
standards only require[s] describing [the affirmative] defense in 
‘general terms.’”189  At least one district court in the Ninth 
 
185. See, e.g., Signify N. Am. Corp. v. Reggiani Lighting USA, Inc., No. 18 
Civ. 11098 (ER), 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49792, at *28–29 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 23, 
2020) (applying the plausibility pleading standard to affirmative defenses but 
declining to engage in the Second Circuit’s less rigorous inquiry because 
defendant pled a counterclaim); Emerson Elec. Co., 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
100957, at *16 (allowing defenses to stand that it describes as “conclusory”). 
186. See, e.g., Jablonski, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53531. 
187. See, e.g., Red Label Music Publ’g, Inc. v. Chila Prods., 388 F. Supp. 
3d 975, 983 (N.D. Ill. 2019) (“The Second Circuit’s approach is persuasive, and 
the Court follows its lead.”).  But see Doe v. Bojangles’ Rests., Inc., No. 4:19-
CV-26-TAV-SKL, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88348, at *8–9 (E.D. Tenn. May 9, 
2019) (“[T]he recent out-of-circuit authority cited by Plaintiff, [GEOMC], 
although also well-reasoned, does not persuade me this Court would now apply 
the Twombly/Ashcroft plausibility standard to affirmative defenses.”). 
188. See, e.g., LSREF2 Baron, L.L.C. v. Tauch, 751 F.3d 394 (5th Cir. 
2014); Garrison Realty, L.P. v. Fouse Architecture & Interiors, P.C., 546 Fed. 
App’x 458 (5th Cir. 2013); McNeely v. Trans Union LLC, No. H-18-849, 2019 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12950 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 28, 2019). 
189. Kohler v. Flava Enters., 779 F.3d 1016, 1019 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting 
5 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 33, at § 1274) (“As numerous federal courts 
have held, an affirmative defense may be pleaded in general terms and will be 
held to be sufficient, and therefore invulnerable to a motion to strike, as long 
as it gives the plaintiff fair notice of the nature of the defense.”); Sundby v. 
Marquee Funding Grp., No. 19-cv-0390-GPC-AHG, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
198927, at *3–4 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 13, 2019); see also Simmons v. Navajo Cnty., 
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Circuit has opined that the Ninth Circuit had thus definitively 
resolved the question of the applicability of plausibility pleading 
to affirmative defenses within the Ninth Circuit, going so far as 
to abandon a previous pro-extension position.190  And perhaps 
more express still, the Sixth Circuit ruled that “[t]he Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure do not require a heightened pleading 
standard for [the affirmative] defense.”191  The Sixth Circuit 
expressly maintained Conley’s fair notice standard with direct 
reference to the language of Rule 8.192  Some district courts in 
the Sixth Circuit have felt obliged to adhere to the Sixth Circuit’s 
interpretation of the Federal Rules to rule that the plausibility 
pleading standard does not extend to affirmative defenses.193 
Holdings like these suggest that the Second Circuit’s 
position will become increasingly isolated as more circuit courts 
rule on the issue.194  In this way, it is quite likely that declining 
 
609 F.3d 1011, 1023 (9th Cir. 2010) (“The key to determining the sufficiency of 
pleading an affirmative defense is whether it gives [a] plaintiff fair notice of 
the defense.”); Walker v. Charter Commc’ns Inc., No. 3:15-cv-00556-RCJ-VPC, 
2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84510, at *4–5 (D. Nev. June 29, 2016). 
190. Castellano v. Access Premier Realty7, Inc., No. 1:15-cv-00407-MCE-
MJS, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 158078, at *3–4 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2015) 
(“District Courts in this circuit were previously split on whether the 
heightened pleading standard that the United States Supreme Court 
announced in Twombly and Iqbal applied to affirmative defenses.  . . . The 
Ninth Circuit, however, has resolved the split in the district courts.  . . . 
Accordingly, this Court now applies the ‘fair notice’ standard, and not the 
heightened pleading standard announced in Twombly and Iqbal, when 
evaluating motions to strike affirmative defenses.”). 
191. Montgomery v. Wyeth, 580 F.3d 455, 468 (6th Cir. 2009). 
192. Id. 
193. See, e.g., Meyers v. Vill. of Oxford, No. 17-cv-10623, 2019 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 24637, at *8 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 15, 2019) (“In sum, controlling Sixth 
Circuit law and the language of the applicable rules weigh against application 
of Twombly and Iqbal’s heightened pleading standard to defendant’s 
affirmative defenses here.”); Exclusively Cats Veterinary Hosp., P.C. v. Pharm. 
Credit Corp., No. 13-cv-14376, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132440, at *2–3 (E.D. 
Mich. Sept. 22, 2014) (same); Paducah River Painting, Inc. v. McNational Inc., 
No. 5:11-CV-00135-R, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131291, at *8 (W.D. Ky. Nov. 14, 
2011) (“[T]he Sixth Circuit rejected the higher pleading standard in favor of 
the fair notice standard.”). 
194. See United States ex rel. Patzer v. Sikorsky Aircraft Corp., 382 F. 
Supp. 3d 860, 864 (E.D. Wis. 2019) (quoting In re Frescati Shipping Co., 886 
F.3d 291, 313 (3d Cir. 2018)) (“In general, an affirmative defense need not be 
articulated with any rigorous degree of specificity, and is sufficiently raised for 
purposes of [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8] by its bare assertion.”); Bigfoot 
on the Strip, LLC v. Winchester, No. 18-3155-CV-S-BP, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
173447, at *3 (W.D. Mo. Oct. 9, 2018) (citing Zotos v. Lindbergh Sch. Dist., 121 
35
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to extend the plausibility pleading standard to affirmative 
defenses will be the majority position among the circuit courts 
as it is among the district courts. 
V. COURTS SHOULD CONTINUE TO DECLINE TO EXTEND 
PLAUSIBILITY PLEADING TO AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES 
This Section explains how declining to extend plausibility 
pleading to affirmative defenses remains the stronger position, 
despite GEOMC.  Then, it will offer recommendations on how 
courts should respond to the issue when it might present itself 
to them. 
A. Declining to Extend Plausibility Pleading Is Still the 
Superior Position 
The language of the Federal Rules disallows the extension 
of the plausibility pleading standard to affirmative defenses.195  
The language and policy considerations of Twombly and Iqbal 
discourage it.196  Unavoidable notions of simple fairness counsel 
against it.197  Absent express binding contrary precedent, any 
court to address the issue should adhere to the majority position 
and decline to extend the plausibility pleading standard to 
affirmative defenses.198 
No court choosing to extend plausibility pleading to 
affirmative defenses has offered a compelling argument to rebuff 
the fact that their selected outcome is flatly contrary to the 
 
F.3d 356, 361 (8th Cir. 1997)) (ruling that an affirmative defense need not be 
pled with any degree of particularity).  “[T]he Eighth Circuit, if presented with 
the question, might well conclude that Zotos has been abrogated by Iqbal and 
Twombly . . . But Zotos is squarely on point, and Iqbal and Twombly are not, 
which means Zotos remains the law of this Circuit.”  Winchester, 2018 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 173447, at *3. 
195. See supra notes 51–55 and accompanying text. 
196. See supra notes 50, 58–64 and accompanying text. 
197. See supra notes 56–57 and accompanying text. 
198. See United States v. Kennebec Scrap Iron, Inc., No. 1:16-cv-191-GZS, 
2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 156004, at *4 n.1 (D. Me. Nov. 10, 2016) (“However, the 
Court declines to extend the Twombly/Iqbal pleading standard to affirmative 
defenses given that the First Circuit has yet to address the question.”).  But see 
Espitia v. Mezzetti Fin. Servs., Inc., No. 18-cv-02480-VKD, 2019 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 14469, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 2019) (“[A]bsent clear controlling 
authority, [this Court] joins the judges of this district that apply the Twombly 
and Iqbal pleading standard to affirmative defenses.”). 
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language of the Federal Rules.  The law is clear and inescapable: 
Rule 8(c) requires only that a defendant “state” its affirmative 
defenses and does not require a defendant to make a 
“showing.”199  Indeed, courts choosing to extend plausibility 
pleading to affirmative defenses frequently select not to mention 
Rule 8(c), even though it controls the question.200  These silences 
speak poorly of the decisions in which they occur; Rule 8(c) 
mandates a result other than the one these courts reach. 
Neither Twombly nor Iqbal changes this reading.  If 
anything, the specific and exclusive focus in those decisions on 
Rule 8(a) counsels against extension.201  Further, only the 
Supreme Court is empowered to alter the pleading standard for 
affirmative defenses articulated in the Federal Rules, which it 
has not done.202  It is outside the authority of any lower court to 
alter the scope or meaning of any Rule; there is a non-trivial 
argument that every court that selects to extend the plausibility 
pleading standard to affirmative defenses violates the Rules 
Enabling Act.203 
As is widely referenced, defendants have a very limited 
window in which to retain counsel and offer a defense (typically 
twenty-one days).204  This is in contrast to the years that 
plaintiffs have to formulate their complaints.  Holding these 
parties to an equal standard presents widely divergent 
burdens.205 
 
199. See Wells Fargo & Co. v. United States, 750 F. Supp. 2d 1049, 1051 
(D. Minn. 2010) (“An affirmative defense is not a claim for relief, and neither 
Rule 8(a)(2) nor any other rule requires a defendant to plead facts ‘showing’ 
that the plaintiff is not entitled to relief.”). 
200. GEOMC Co. v. Calmare Therapeutics Inc., 918 F.3d 92, 99 (2d Cir. 
2019). 
201. See cases cited supra note 50 and accompanying text. 
202. See sources cited supra note 5 and accompanying text; cf. Bell 
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 
(2009). 
203. See Jennifer M. Auger, A ‘Plausible’ Outcome?: Twombly, Iqbal, and 
the Unforeseen Impact on Affirmative Defenses, 75 MD. L. REV. 905, 932 (2016) 
(“The decision by district courts to extend the ‘heightened’ plausibility 
standard beyond the arena of complaints as established by the Supreme Court 
in [Twombly] and [Iqbal] violates the [Rules Enabling] Act.”); Stephen Mayer, 
Note, An Implausible Standard for Affirmative Defenses, 112 MICH. L. REV. 
275, 298–300 (2013). 
204. See cases cited supra note 56 and accompanying text. 
205. See Wells Fargo & Co. v. United States, 750 F. Supp. 2d 1049, 1051 
(D. Minn. 2010). 
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Moreover, the Rules also require that a defendant plead any 
affirmative defense that it has at pain of waiving that 
affirmative defense.206  The courts that choose to extend the 
plausibility pleading standard to affirmative defenses force 
defendants to play a critical game of chicken in which they can 
only lose.207  These defendants must either select not to plead a 
defense or they must hope later to amend their response.208  
Those seeking to amend a response will surely be resisted and, 
despite the purposefully lenient standard, will sometimes be 
rejected.209 
Similarly, the burdens imposed upon the courts and adverse 
litigants by “unnecessary” pleadings from plaintiffs or 
defendants are not alike in scale or scope.210  No real 
equivocation is possible.  Plaintiffs fill dockets and seek access 
to discovery.211  This is plain from the fact that a successful 
motion to dismiss the complaint will preclude further discovery 
or litigation activities, while a successful motion to strike will 
 
206. Meyers v. Vill. of Oxford, No. 17-cv-10623, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
24637, at *9 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 15, 2019) (“Although there are some exceptions, 
it is generally understood that the failure to allege an affirmative defense in 
the first responsive pleading may result in a waiver of the defense.”). 
207. See Vogel v. Huntington Oaks Del. Partners, LLC, 291 F.R.D. 438, 
441 (C.D. Cal. 2013); Francisco v. Verizon S., Inc., No. 3:09-cv-737, 2010 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 77083, at *15 (E.D. Va. July 29, 2010). 
208. McGinity v. USAA Fed. Savs. Bank, No. 5:19-cv-560-BO, slip op. at 
3 (E.D.N.C. Apr. 14, 2020); Racick v. Domonion L. Assocs., 270 F.R.D. 228, 234 
(E.D.N.C. 2010); Palmer v. Oakland Farms, Inc., No. 5:10cv00029, 2010 WL 
2605179, at *6 (W.D. Va. June 24, 2010) (“Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure contemplates that motions to amend pleadings on that basis of 
relevant facts learned during discovery, and such motions should be liberally 
granted.”). 
209. See Henry v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, No. 17cv0688 JM(NLS), 
2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30779, at *7–8 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 26, 2018) (“[A] heightened 
pleading standard may require the court to address multiple motions to amend 
the answer as discovery reveals additional defenses.”); Florilli Transp. v. W. 
Express, Inc., No. 14-CV-00988-DW, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 185459, at *4 
(W.D. Mo. Feb. 20, 2015) (“[T]hen, after taking discovery, [defendants will 
need] to move the Court for permission to amend their answers to add 
affirmative defenses . . . Thus, another round of motion practice would be added 
to many cases, increasing the burdens on the federal courts, and adding 
expense and delay for the parties.”). 
210. See supra notes 40–43 and accompanying text. 
211. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 559 (2007); see also 
Bayer CropScience A.G. v. Dow AgroSciences LLC, No. 10-1045 RMB/JS, 2011 
U.S Dist. LEXIS 149636, at *3 (D. Del. Dec. 30, 2011) (noting “the absence of a 
concern that the defense is unlocking the doors of discovery”). 
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achieve neither.212  Moreover, defendants cannot force 
settlements based upon unsupported affirmative defenses.213  
Indeed, the desire to curb unwarranted but business-rational 
settlements was a prime motivation of the Supreme Court in 
Twombly.214  Following the Supreme Court’s reasoning would 
counsel for making the pleading standard for claims tougher, but 
not the pleading standard for affirmative defenses. 
B.   What Courts Should Do from Here 
The arguments against extending plausibility pleading to 
affirmative defenses are overwhelming.  Courts at all levels 
should continue to embrace and encourage this reality. 
First, it seems unlikely that the Supreme Court would have 
an opportunity to rule on the sufficiency of the pleading of an 
affirmative defense.  Even so, the Supreme Court does consider 
issues of federal procedure that exist among the lower courts.215  
It might offer language or explanation in its next rulemaking to 
clarify that the plausibility pleading standard applies only to 
claims. 
Circuit courts in jurisdictions other than the Second Circuit 
should meet the question head-on and definitively reject the 
extension of the plausibility pleading standard to affirmative 
defenses.216  District courts in circuits other than the Second 
 
212. See Florida v. DLT 3 Girls, Inc., No. 4:11-cv-3624, 2012 WL 1565533, 
at *2 (S.D. Tex. May 2, 2012). 
213. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 559; see also In re Quaker Oats Labeling 
Litig., No. C 10-0502 RS, 2013 WL 12155299, at *1 (N.D. Cal. May 20, 2013) 
(“Permitting a plaintiff to proceed on a conclusory or factually deficient 
complaint potentially exposes the defendant to expensive and intrusive 
discovery, and to pressure to settle the matter for its ‘nuisance value.’  In most 
cases, even the most conclusory affirmative defenses do not impose similar 
burdens.”); Leon v. Jacobson Transp. Co., No. 10 C 4939, 2010 WL 4810600, at 
*1 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 19, 2010) (“The point [of Twombly and Iqbal] was to reduce 
nuisance suits filed solely to obtain a nuisance settlement.  The Court, though, 
has never once lost sleep worrying about defendants filing nuisance affirmative 
defenses.”). 
214. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558–59. 
215. See Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072–2074.  The Rules are 
periodically updated by the Supreme Court via an elaborate committee review 
procedure, pursuant to a statutory requirement that the Judicial Conference 
of the United States, the national policy-making body for the federal courts, 
must “carry on a continuous study of the operation and effect of the general 
rules of practice and procedure . . . .”  28 U.S.C. § 331. 
216. See supra notes 188–94 and accompanying text. 
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Circuit should likewise decline to apply Twombly to affirmative 
defenses whenever the issue is offered to them.  For the most 
part, this is what the district courts currently do, so no great 
upheaval is suggested.217 
As to the Second Circuit, it should revisit its GEOMC 
decision.  As discussed above, the ruling is not supportable.218  
Short of revisiting GEOMC, the Second Circuit should articulate 
the reasoning by which it concluded that the plausibility 
pleading standard extends to affirmative defenses.219  As it 
stands, the concerns the Second Circuit expressed with “context” 
already have a well-tailored solution: notice pleading.220  It 
accommodates defendants’ severe disadvantage in timeframe, 
and it allows all affirmative defenses to be considered 
similarly.221  Perhaps most of all, it allows for district courts to 
manage reasonably the matters before them pursuant to the 
Federal Rules, while not inviting a glut of unnecessary motion 
practice.222 
Lower courts in the Second Circuit should apply the 
nebulous “context” standard as broadly as possible.223  Perhaps 
as an unintended side-effect of the peculiarities of the GEOMC 
decision, a district court could quite rationally accept as 
adequately pled every affirmative defense offered within the 
twenty-one days normally accorded to defendants to respond to 
a complaint while still remaining fully compliant with the 
GEOMC ruling.224  Indeed, district courts in the Second Circuit 
should rule in every instance that the time frames are too brief, 
the prejudices to defendants too severe, and the relative burdens 
too lopsided to restrict defendants’ opportunity to offer a full and 
vigorous defense. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Most courts to consider the issue have come to the correct 
 
217. See sources cited supra note 69 and accompanying text. 
218. See GEOMC Co. v. Calmare Therapeutics Inc., 918 F.3d 92, 95 (2d 
Cir. 2019). 
219. See supra notes 122–27 and accompanying text. 
220. See supra notes 112–14 and accompanying text. 
221. See supra notes 113–14 and accompanying text. 
222. See cases cited supra note 64 and accompanying text. 
223. See GEOMC, 918 F.3d at 98. 
224. Id. 
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conclusion: procedure, precedent, and policy all strongly disfavor 
extending the plausibility pleading standard articulated in 
Twombly and refined in Iqbal to affirmative defenses.  Nothing 
in the last ten years, including the Second Circuit’s GEOMC 
decision, has cast doubt on this basic analysis.  Courts presented 
with the issue should continue to remember the requirement of 
Federal Rule 8(e)—that pleadings must be construed so as to do 
justice—and decline to extend the plausibility pleading standard 
to affirmative defenses. 
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